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POLICY
PAPER 2
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2 Fundamentals of the concept of user charges 3 Charging the use of airspace by aviation
Regulatory gap in international aviation and the raising of a user charge Designing a user charge Level and use of revenue
Regulatory gap in ocean shipping and the raising of a user charge Designing a user charge Level and use of revenue
Designing a system of payments for non utilization obligations Preconditions to operationalization and research needs
1 Introduction: User charges to promote global sustainabilityIn
the run-up to the United Nations International Conference on Financing
for Development (UNFfD) due in March 2002 and the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) due in September 2002, the question of how to finance
global sustainability policy is moving to the centre of attention. The
problems of global change are mounting (WBGU, 2001), and the international
community is increasingly pronouncing its willingness to tackle these
problems in a cooperative fashion. However, the question of how to raise
the necessary financial resources has not yet been resolved satisfactorily.
This
affects, among other things, the ambitious development goals set by the
United Nations at the Millennium Summit in September 2000. These goals
include, above all, halving by 2015 the proportion of the world’s
people living in extreme poverty, but also improving access to potable
water and basic health services, achieving universal primary education
and preventing a further spread of HIV/AIDS. Whether these and other sustainability
goals can be achieved is called into question not least by stagnating
official development assistance (ODA) budgets.
These problems are on the agenda of the UNFfD conference, which will take
place in Monterrey, Mexico. The developing countries expect substantial
commitments by the industrialized countries to increase resource transfers
and to implement promptly the goal of making available to developing countries
0.7% of industrialized-country gross domestic product for official development
cooperation activities. If no agreement to increase financial transfers
from North to South can be found, the success of the WSSD in Johannesburg
also appears endangered. However, the UNFfD will also tackle, in addition
to official development finance, other topics such as mobilizing domestic
financial resources, private capital flows, international trade, mitigating
the indebtedness of developing countries and reforming the international
financial system. The question of official development finance thus needs
to be examined within the context of this comprehensive agenda. Besides
increasing the financial resources for official development cooperation,
this is also a matter of creating appropriate institutional framework
conditions at national and international levels so that private-sector
and public-sector sources of finance can be harnessed increasingly for
concerns of international environment and development policy.
The
German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) wishes to contribute to
the debate in this area. The Council has already addressed these questions
in its 2000 annual report “New Structures for Global Environmental
Policy”, proposing, among other things, the levying of charges for
the use of certain global common goods (‘global commons’) such
as international airspace and the high seas (WBGU, 2001). In that report,
the Council also noted the possibility of introducing international payments
for non utilization obligations in order to safeguard national resources
whose conservation is of common global concern.
In
this policy paper, the Council summarizes the key findings of its special
report on user charges within the framework of global sustainability policy
(WBGU, 2002), and makes recommendations for a politically viable implementation
of the concept of global user charges for three specific areas of application:
2 Fundamentals of the concept of user chargesThe
global common goods of international airspace and the high seas are ‘open
access goods’ – for which property rights cannot easily be allocated.
Where common rules of good practice in the use of these goods are not
agreed upon, there is a danger of overexploitation because the users need
not bear the full social costs of their actions. These global commons
would thus need to be administered in trust by the international community.
It
is at this point that the concept of user charges comes into play. The
aim of raising a charge is to close regulatory gaps that lead to the overexploitation
of global common goods. The charge makes a connection between the use
of environmental resources and use-related impairments. The scarcity of
a resource and the costs of its provision are signalled to users through
the payment they must make. This generates incentive effects reducing
environmental pressure (the incentive function of user charges). Furthermore,
user charges mobilize additional financial resources that should be earmarked
to finance the conservation and restoration of global common goods (the
financing function of user charges).
The
charges should be lowered if pressures on the environmental resource decline.
This close connection with environmental protection is pivotal to the
concept of user charges and has a certain proximity to the concept of
‘public charges’ used in public finance. The concept of user
charges is thus distinct from taxation, which makes no direct connection
between the payment of a tax and the service to be financed.
The
example of the use of international airspace illustrates the functions
of user charges: The level of charges must take into consideration the
contribution of aviation to global greenhouse gas emissions and the associated
climate damage. The user charges create economic incentives to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by means of improved technologies and changes
in behaviour on the demand side. The revenue generated should be earmarked
to finance global climate protection policy. Earmarking means in this
instance that the financial resources should be spent to finance measures
aiming to conserve and restore the quality of the public good ‘climate’
and to finance measures aiming to promote adaptation to climate-related
damage.
User
charges also have desirable distributional effects. Those who use environmental
resources most make, by paying a user charge, the biggest contribution
to financing the protection and conservation of global commons. At the
same time, the way in which the revenue is spent can generate desirable
distributional effects at international level. The use of the financial
resources should favour those countries which are particularly affected
by the environmental damage resulting from the use of airspace or the
oceans and have a low economic capacity.
An
advantage of user charges is that political resistance can be overcome
more easily if the use of revenue is earmarked and can be seen in connection
with the resource utilized. This has particular relevance when implementing
the approach at international level. The approval by developing countries
of a system of global user charges will doubtlessly be gained more readily
if disbursements are earmarked for global sustainability policy measures
than if revenues are spent without earmarking.
3 Charging the use of airspace by aviationEnvironmental impacts of aviationThe
principal emissions arising from aviation are carbon dioxide (CO2),
nitrogen oxides (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO),
hydrocarbons, water vapour, sulphur oxides (SOX)
and aerosol particles. Within the context of raising charges on the
use of international airspace, only the impact on climate is to be taken
into consideration as a global environmental impact. For this, not only
the emissions of the greenhouse gases CO2 and
water vapour are relevant, but also the impacts of NOX,
SOX and aerosol emissions upon ozone and methane
(CH4) concentrations and upon condensation trail
(contrail) formation. The overall present climate impact from historic
and present aviation is about twice the radiative effect of CO2
emissions from aviation. It is important to note that a reduction in
some greenhouse gases from aviation may possibly result in an increase
in other, equally harmful emissions. For example, curbing fuel consumption
reduces CO2 emissions but tends to promote the
formation of NOX. Regulatory gap in international aviation and the raising of a user chargeDespite
their substantial climate effects, the CO2 emissions
of international aviation are not subject to any quantitative reduction
obligations. They are not included in national-level emissions inventories
and thus do not fall within the scope of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.
The Council thus finds an alarming regulatory gap relating to the use
of the atmosphere by international aviation. For reasons of climate protection,
this gap needs to be closed as a matter of urgency.
The
Council recommends to the German government that this regulatory gap should
be closed by intoducing a user charge. Charging the use of airspace can
make a valuable contribution to climate protection because it generates
both an environment-related incentive effect and financial resources.
The environment-related incentive effect has two leverage aspects: First,
it is to be expected that user charges on aviation will drive air fares
upwards, thus dampening the growth in demand for air transport. Second,
user charges can create incentives to modify aircraft, engines, air routes
etc. such that these are associated with the least possible emissions.
Designing a user chargeThere
are various options for designing a user charge on aviation. User charges
can increase air transport prices directly in the form of a ticket levy,
they can be based upon kerosene consumption or aircraft emissions, or
they can be implemented in the form of tradable emissions permits.
User
charge schemes that create appropriate incentives on the supply side to
reduce environmental impacts while at the same time generating additional
financial resources are of particular benefit. While the blanket increase
in air transport prices produced by a ticket levy creates only slight
economic incentives to reduce environmental impacts, both a kerosene levy
and an emissions-based levy generate significant environment-related incentive
effects. Compared to a kerosene tax, an emissions-based levy has the advantage
that opportunities for evasion are more limited and potential revenue
is thus higher. In particular, the practice of ‘tankering’ (refuelling
kerosene at airports in countries not subject to the levy) greatly diminishes
the potential revenue of a kerosene levy and generates additional negative
environmental impacts due to greater flying weight and detours flown.
A further advantage of emissions-based user charges is that they make
it possible to give explicit consideration to different types of emissions.
Tradable emissions permits have the drawback that significant financial
resources would only be generated if the permits were auctioned. Yet,
an auctioning of permits is bound to hit political resistance.
Consequently,
the Council recommends to the German government that it promotes at international
level the introduction of an emissions-based user charge. This should
ideally be designed in a way that the rate of the levy is determined by
the aircraft type, engine type, (average) air route, distance and load
– a ‘calculated emissions levy’. The precise design of
an optimized charging scheme should be determined by international institutions.
In order to minimize resistance against introduction of such a charge,
the Council recommends commencing initially with a moderate levy rate.
This applies particularly in the case of EU-wide introduction in order
to avoid excessive competitive disadvantages for the European aviation
sector. The further rises of the rate dictated by climate protection considerations
should be set in a fixed time schedule in order to both enhance the environmental
incentive effect on a continuous basis and to permit long-term calculation
for the aviation sector.
The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an institution that
could play an important role in collecting an emissions-based levy. For
this, however, ICAO would need to be integrated more closely into global
environmental protection structures than has been the case until now.
Given the political will environmental policy objectives could be given
greater importance in ICAO vis-à-vis the particularistic and short-term
economic interests of individual countries. For instance, it would be
conceivable that the parties to the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
call upon ICAO to set binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions from aviation. As it may be assumed that ICAO has an interest
in establishing a regime within its own organizational structures, this
would give incentives to start elaborating an emissions-based user charge
regime without delay. Alternatively, the CO2 emissions
of the aviation sector could be integrated into the Kyoto Protocol.
Level and use of revenueVarious
IPCC scenarios estimate the share of aviation in radiative forcing from
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to amount to 3.5–15% in the
year 2050 (IPCC, 1999). A conservative estimate of climate-related damage
(including adaptation costs) and avoidance costs (e.g. for emissions abatement)
suggests total costs of some Euro 100–200 billion annually. The share
attributable to aviation would then figure about Euro 3–30 billion
annually. Although this estimate of climate-related damage is subject
to many uncertainties, it can be assumed that a calculated emissions levy
– at its maximum level at the end of a step-by-step increase of the
levy rate and given worldwide introduction of the levy system – could
indeed generate revenue of that magnitude.
The
revenue should be spent to restore and conserve the quality of the global
good to be protected, i.e. the climate. This would mainly entail the prevention
of greenhouse gas emissions in sectors other than aviation. More specifically,
these could be measures to improve energy efficiency or to intensify the
use of renewable energy sources.
Furthermore,
measures to adapt to or ‘repair’ climate-related damage would
need to be financed. Here care needs to be taken that the connection between
damage for which adaptation measures are to be financed and the climatic
changes causing the damage is as close as possible. Coastal protection
measures such as dike construction in response to climate-related sea-level
rise are an example of measures closely connected to climatic changes
(‘first order’ climate damage). Revenue loss suffered by countries
whose touristic attractiveness declines due to climate-related damage
(e.g. through the degradation of coral reefs) is an example of damage
further removed from the initial cause in the causal chain of climate
impacts; even social disruption (e.g. rising levels of criminality) is
part of this chain. These are cases of ‘higher order’ climate-related
damage.
Whether
and with which priority measures to repair higher order damage should
be financed from the revenue of user charges remains open to debate. To
determine the scope of earmarking, there is a need for criteria; these
must be formulated through intergovernmental negotiations, building upon
further research activities.
Financial
resources should be spent primarily to countries that have explicit climate
policies, experience high levels of environmental damage attributable
to aviation-related air pollution and have low economic capacity. Adequate
consideration needs to be given to the efficiency with which resources
are spent. With this in mind, financing could be mainly programme- or
project-focused in the countries that are fundamentally eligible for support.
As
concerns the administration of spending, the Council recommends entrusting
existing international institutions in the climate protection sphere with
the greater part of the revenue. The three new funds agreed at Marrakesh
within the climate regime, i.e. the Special Climate Change Fund, the Adaptation
Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, are particularly suited for
the disbursement of the revenue. Some of the financial resources might
be allocated directly to the climate window of the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), which is the financing mechanism of the Climate Convention.
Care needs to be taken that enough attention is paid to compensating for
and repairing the specific damage caused by emissions of greenhouse gases
by aviation. In addition, it must be ensured that existing GEF funding
is not reduced as a consequence of the new source of funding.
With
regard to political enforceability, it would presumably only be possible
to implement a model which permits the revenue from the user charges to
be allocated to both national and international institutions. What percentages
of the revenues are to be allocated to the two categories of recipients
would have to be negotiated at the international level. Possible criteria
for deciding on the percentages might be, for example, the extent of national
damage as a consequence of climate change as well as the economic capacity
of the various countries. In principle, however, at least in the medium
and long term, the majority of the funds should go to international institutions.
Institutions hosting such negotiations could be the conferences of the
parties to the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol. With regard
to the political enforcement of appropriate mechanisms for disbursement
of the revenues from user charges, the Council considers it indispensable
to conduct an evaluation of previous climate policy experience.
4 Charging the use of the oceans by shippingEnvironmental impacts of shippingDespite
intensified efforts to protect the oceans in recent years at both international
and national level, their condition continues to deteriorate. Marine and
coastal ecosystems are under particular pressure from inputs of pollutants,
nutrients and sediment particles. Shipping is, over long distances, by
far the most environmentally sound form of transportation. In particular,
it is much more energy-efficient than aviation, which gives rise to up
to 100 times higher CO2 emissions per tonne of
freight. Nevertheless ocean shipping is still a significant source of
marine and air pollution with CO2 emissions also
contributing to anthropogenic climate change.
Oil
discharges by shipping cause, at least locally, considerable pressure
upon the ecosystems affected. Tributyltin (TBT) released from anti-fouling
paint, which is intended to protect ships’ hulls from the growth
of marine organisms, accumulates in the sediments of the seabed. Its hormonal
effects may, for example, lead to sex changes in marine snails. Non-indigenous
species are introduced to distant ecosystems by the uncontrolled exchange
of ballast waters. Under certain circumstances this may have a destructive
impact on biological diversity in the new host ecosystem and lead to considerable
economic losses.
In
addition to these discharges to the oceans, shipping also emits pollutants
to the atmosphere. Shipping is responsible for around 7% of the CO2
emissions from the transport sector or for around 2% of global CO2
emissions. Furthermore, around 7% of all sulphur dioxide (SO2)
and 11–12% of all nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions
may be attributed to shipping.
Regulatory gap in ocean shipping and the raising of a user chargeThe
high seas are not subject to the legal sovereignty of any state. Even
after the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), the use of the high seas for transportation remains
a classic example of a global open access good. An inseparable ecological
connection exists between coastal waters and the high seas. Mounting global
degradation of the ecosystems of coastal waters is threatening to extend
to the high seas and even to the deep sea. Therefore, the Council considers
it justified to classify the oceans as such, including the territorial
coastal waters, as a scarce global common good – regardless of their
legal allocation to the different levels of national sovereignties established
in UNCLOS. Consequently, the introduction of user charges needs to be
considered in order to close the prevailing regulatory gap.
Levying
user charges creates incentives to reduce shipping-induced marine pollution.
In view of the relatively good environmental performance of ocean transportation
and its significance for world trade, the primary aim of such a charging
scheme is not to reduce the volume of ocean transportation. The aim is
rather to create an incentive for measures to be taken, particularly in
the areas of technology and environmental management, to reduce shipping-induced
marine pollution. The Council considers it appropriate to pursue an integrated
approach, including environmental impacts which are only indirectly related
to marine pollution, in particular CO2 and SO2
emissions caused by shipping. The financial resources generated should
be earmarked for measures to conserve and restore the quality of the oceans.
Designing a user chargeThe
Council proposes raising a charge that is collected annually and is differentiated
according to ecological criteria. Proceeding from a base rate, rebates
could be granted as a function of the general quality and also environmental
quality of ships. Important criteria in this regard comprise shipping
company policy (including environmental management), ship design, construction
and equipment and the management of operations on board ship. The base
rate would be determined as a function of ship tonnage (tdw), ship engine
power (kW) and a charge factor. This factor would be set depending upon
the level of revenue targeted and upon the environment-related incentive
effect desired.
In
the opinion of the Council, user charges should initially only be raised
in industrialized countries. Interested developing and transition countries
could then possibly join the system at a later stage. However, the system
should cover all ships – regardless of flag state and seat of the
shipping company. As the greater part of ocean shipping starts or ends
within industrialized countries, the majority of shipping can be covered
in the ports. Raising user charges may also serve – if funds are
spent accordingly – as a clear signal of the willingness of the industrialized
countries to contribute to financing global sustainability. In view of
the unsatisfactory results achieved to date in negotiations on improving
environmental standards for ships under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), the Council recommends establishing such
a user charge system within the framework of the OECD. In the past the
OECD has developed a range of activities in the shipping sector. Close
cooperation with the IMO would be essential in order to avoid contradictions
and overlap with IMO activities. The development of a catalogue of criteria
by the OECD could provide important impulses for the swift (further) development
of binding environmental standards by the IMO.
Level and use of revenueApplying
the charge factor recommended by the Council for the initial phase and
assuming initial EU-wide introduction, annual revenue would amount to
Euro 360–720 million (minus the rebates for environmentally sound
ships).
In
order to make the connection between the raising of the charge and the
use of revenue, the funds spent must benefit marine conservation. A first
approach would be to use funds directly to mitigate damage caused by shipping.
This, however, is hampered by various problems, such as localizing the
environmental impacts of shipping. The Council therefore suggests widening
the scope of earmarking: Revenue should be spent to protect the oceans
in their entirety. In light of the interplay among various environmental
influences and the complexity of marine ecosystems, an effective protection
of the oceans and particularly of coastal waters can only be achieved
if all relevant impacts are taken into consideration. Consequently, the
Council takes the view that the financial resources generated by the user
charge should be spent mainly for integrated coastal management in order
to reduce the adverse effects of all uses of the oceans to an environmentally
acceptable level.
Because
developing and transition countries lack the resources to develop and
implement integrated coastal management, the Council considers it appropriate
to use the available funds primarily in these countries. The efficiency
of spending is a further argument in favour of this. It can generally
be assumed that developing and transition countries have the largest potential
for a comparatively cost-effective reduction of impacts upon the marine
environment. In addition, such a spending lends a development policy element
to the scheme which promises to enhance the political enforceability at
international level.
The
administration of the funds can build upon existing international structures.
At the project level, funds should be administered by the GEF, whose operative
programmes already cover the marine environmental protection sector. The
principle of limiting support to ‘agreed full incremental costs’
should be adhered to in this instance. The substantive specifications
for allocating the funds should be determined in accordance with the Global
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-Based Activities (GPA). Close coordination with the Biodiversity
Convention would also be recommendable. There are already funds for marine
environmental protection projects within the context of GEF activities.
In
addition, a part of the revenues should be spent to finance the expansion
of port state control in participating states. This could establish stronger
monitoring of the implementation of existing environmental standards and,
moreover, would serve as an incentive for countries outside the OECD to
participate in the system of user charges.
5 Payments for non utilization obligationsThe conceptIn
contrast to the two forms of user charges set out above, the concept of
non utilization obligation payments (NUOPs) does not address ‘global
common goods’, but national-level ‘goods of global value’
whose conservation is a common concern of humankind. These can be, for
instance, the conservation of biological diversity or of land and freshwater
areas. These goods fall clearly under the sovereignty of states. In that
sense, there is no regulatory gap. Nevertheless, the way in which the
management of these goods is presently regulated endangers the conservation
of biological diversity, for example, because for many states the –
in some instances poverty-induced – degrading of their natural resources
generates (over the short term) higher yields than the provision of the
good ‘conservation of biological diversity’. Here the concept
of NUOPs comes into play. Under the concept, abstaining from degrading
use is rewarded by payments in order to provide financial incentives for
the conservation of environmental goods of global value.
User
payment schemes thus also make sense for national-level environmental
goods whose conservation generates global benefit. The users of services
resulting from the conservation of these global goods would have to pay
for that use – be it the use of ecological functions or of the existence
value. In order to ensure that the environment-related incentive effect
trickles down to the level at which degradation takes place, funds should
be spent at least in part to provide compensation for those who would
have derived income from a degrading use. This would also do justice to
poverty-induced environmental problems.
Designing a system of payments for non utilization obligationsThe
NUOP approach is not restricted to situations in which all kinds of local
use are to be abstained from. Certain forms of commercial use can be permitted
explicitly if they are compatible with the conservation of the good. NUOPs
are therefore consistent with the ecosystem approach of the Biodiversity
Convention, which integrates the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity.
For
the concrete implementation of NUOPs, various models are conceivable.
Besides bilateral or multilateral negotiations, it would be possible,
for instance, to establish markets for non utilization units (e.g. tradable
conservation credits, TCCs) and to boost private-sector demand for tradable
non utilization obligations by providing tax or other incentives. A worldwide
system of non utilization commitment certificates (NUCCs) is also worth
considering. Such a system presupposes that – ideally all –
states agree not to degrade a certain minimum amount of valuable natural
area. Countries whose sovereign territory harbours only few valuable natural
areas could honour their undertaking by purchasing NUCCs. These certificates
would need to be covered by non utilization units of those countries that
have a ‘surplus’ of valuable natural areas. When issuing the
initial certificates, consideration would need to be given not only to
the proportionate benefit derived by a country from the conservation of
the global environmental resource, but also to that country’s economic
capacity and physiographic endowments. Poorer countries whose territories
harbour no or very few valuable natural areas can hardly be expected to
use their scarce financial resources to purchase tradable NUCCs. From
an economic perspective, the attraction of the tradable NUCCs approach
lies, as with tradable emission permits, in the high level of efficiency.
Moreover, this approach would create an automatic financing mechanism
for the conservation of environmental goods of global value.
Preconditions to operationalization and research needsTo
make NUOPs operable, numerous preconditions must be met and unresolved
research issues clarified. For instance, it needs to be determined who
is entitled to use the natural areas in question, which forms of local
use are allowed, i.e. can be considered sustainable, who the payers are
and who the recipients of payments.
When
implementing a NUOPs system, it is essential to be aware of the risk of
‘moral hazard’. This refers to situations in which, if it is
known that local non utilization will be compensated for, degrading local
uses of environmental resources are pursued all the more in order to drive
the level of compensation payments upwards. Moreover, compensation payments
must not lead to local environmental resources only being conserved in
exchange for international funding, which would weaken countries’
own responsibility vis-à-vis the natural environment and future
generations. This danger is smaller in a tradable NUCCs system than in
‘ordinary’ compensation payment systems because every country
participating and endowed with the relevant resource must initially undertake
a commitment to ensure the conservation of at least a certain quantity
of the resource in question without receiving any payment for this undertaking.
Resolving
the above issues and meeting the preconditions for operationalization
will be time-consuming and will require a lengthy process of consultation.
The Council is nonetheless convinced that the idea of a global system
of tradable NUCCs is worth pursuing as an alternative to other financing
mechanisms such as a tropical forest fund. The Council therefore recommends
raising the profile of NUOPs or tradable NUCCs on the international policy
agenda and intensifying research activities in this field.
The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) provides an international arena
in which pilot projects could be conducted and unresolved issues clarified.
The Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice
(SBSTTA) of the CBD has already elaborated recommendations – focussing
specifically on forest biodiversity – for the establishment of protected
area networks. The strategic decision in favour of an ‘international
ecological network’ is already being called for in various quarters
and may be taken by the CBD COP-6 in April 2002. This would also provide
an opportunity to put NUOPs and the concept of tradable NUCCs on the agenda
and to examine to what extent these instruments could be operationalized
through the GEF, which is the financing mechanism of the CBD.
6 Conclusions: Implementing the concept of global user chargesThe
Council is aware that to implement the innovative instruments discussed
here a major effort is needed to convince the relevant actors. In the
view of the Council, the concept of user charges, owing to its environmental
incentive function in combination with its financing function, should
constitute a significant pillar of global sustainability policy. By presenting
recommendations for a politically viable implementation of the concept
of global user charges, the Council aims to stimulate the German federal
government to look beyond day-to-day politics and seek to close prevailing
regulatory gaps at international level.
Care
needs to be taken when implementing the concept of global user charges
that the financial resources which can thus be generated do not lead to
the funds available for development cooperation activities being reduced.
Even today, a considerable proportion of official development assistance
(ODA) goes towards the creation and preservation of global public goods,
notably those in the environmental sphere. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) estimates this proportion at about 25%. Methodological
problems in calculating such proportions aside, it is clear that the pressure
on development cooperation funds allocated traditionally to development
purposes could be reduced substantially by levying user charges. The Council
recommends factoring the financing contribution of user charges out of
ODA. The revenue of global user charges would then correspond to an imaginary
budget item, namely ‘Global sustainability policy’. The availability
of additional financial resources for global sustainability policy makes
it possible to use development cooperation funds in a more targeted manner
for the ‘classic’ tasks of development cooperation. This approach
would achieve true additionality of the revenue generated by user charges.
A
final point that needs to be taken into consideration with regard to implementing
the concept of global user charges is the aversion of the industrialized
countries to the restriction of their financial sovereignty by the earmarking
of user charges and their disbursement by international organizations.
However, the United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development (UNFfD) may provide an opportunity to reduce this resistance
on the basis of the conference’s focus on the North-South context
and its importance for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).
The Council therefore recommends to the German federal government that
it seizes the opportunity of Monterrey by arguing in favour of implementing
the forms of user charges set out in this policy paper.
ReferencesIPCC
– Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1999): Special Report
on Aviation and the Global Atmosphere. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
WBGU
– German Advisory Council on Global Change (2001): World in Transition:
New Structures for Global Environmental Policy. Heidelberg, Berlin, New
York: Springer.
WBGU
– German Advisory Council on Global Change (2002): Charging the Use
of Global Commons. Special Report. Berlin: WBGU.
AcknowledgementsThis
policy paper would not have been possible without the committed and
untiring effort of the staff of the Council Members and the Council’s
Secretariat in Berlin. The Council wishes to express its fullest gratitude
for their major input to the research analysts Dr Thilo Pahl (WBGU Secretariat,
Berlin), Assessor-jur Tim Bäuerle (Heidelberg), cand oec publ Markus
Dolder (ETH Zürich), cand oec publ Stephanie Fankhauser (ETH Zürich)
and Dipl-Volksw Marc Ringel (University of Mainz). |
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